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I. Demystifying Judges: Professions And Professional Ideology 
Studies of the professions have all too frequently failed to ex-
amine rigorously professional discourse and ideology. As a conse-
quence, professional world views are often taken as givens in em-
pirical and theoretical scholarship on the professions. This is due in 
large part to the considerable influence of functionalism in the sociol-
ogy of professions. Deriving from Durkheim (1933), and most nota-
bly set out in the work of Parsons (1954 a,b), functionalist theory 
views professionals as possessing socially useful esoteric knowledge 
and skills which they employ in the service of public and client good 
rather than for private gain. This view rather uncritically accepts the 
professions' claims to altruism and special competence, which legiti-
mate prerogatives such as restrictive licensing and self-regulation, 
and it downplays the significance of professional involvement in 
market exchange and its consequences. Much scholarship in the 
functionalist tradition considers the rise of professional power and 
control as a phenomenon that self-evidently is rather than something 
that might be profitably examined historically and sociologically. As 
one legal historian revealingly writes: 
The general public has need for a professional man in 
whom it can repose a particular type of confidence when-
ever it is faced with some distressing problems, often of a 
very personal nature. Hence the most important aspect 
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of the practice of law is that it is, and the inherent nature 
of things demands that is always shall be, a profession. 
(Chroust 1965: xi). 
A very different and more recent approach advances a critical 
understanding of professions which highlights their political and so-
cial context. This scholarship, which has roots in Weber (1978), 
builds on the works of Hughes and his students (see e.g., Hughes 
1958). Hughes viewed professions not as inevitable products of so-
cial differentiation but as occupational groups which have managed 
both to achieve exclusive license to carry out activities denied other 
occupations and to claim successfully a broad mandate to define the 
nature and scope of their work. This perspective emphasizes the 
historical specificity and the contingency of professional control in 
the occupational marketplace. As subsequently developed by a di-
verse group of scholars (see, e.g., Abel 1986, 1987; Freidson 1970a, b; 
Gordon 1983, 1984; Johnson, 1972; Larson 1977; Starr 1982; for a cri-
tique of this perspective see Halliday 1987) this critical approach ren-
ders professional claims of expertise and public-mindedness prob-
lematic. It views professional ideology itself as a subject for analysis 
and it explores the historical, political, economic and cultural condi-
tions in which professional power develops and is employed. 
Doris Marie Provine's Judging Credentials is a provocative work 
that draws on and furthers the critical approach to the study of pro-
fessions. The book is a study of judges in lower courts of limited ju-
risdiction who are not lawyers, a group of considerable size. There 
are over 13,000 of them in the United States. In this work Provine 
examines the legal profession's assertion that these judges are inferior 
to judges who are lawyers. Contrary to both professional claims and 
popular belief, Provine argues that lay judges in America's lower 
courts perform as well as their lawyer counterparts. Her conclusions 
derive from extensive original survey data as well as from a thorough 
analysis of the pertinent literature on lay judges. Provine argues that 
although characterizations of lay judges' incompetence are empiri-
cally unsubstantiated, they nevertheless reveal much about the politi-
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cal and cultural control exerted by professions. Provine's work de-
mystifies lawyers' mandate for monopoly control over judgeships, 
and it challenges professional ideology while simultaneously expos-
ing its considerable force in contemporary society. 
II. The Rise of Professional Power and Emergence of Professional 
Control 
In the opening chapters of her book, Provine provides an histor-
ical account of lay judges in the United States and of attempts by 
lawyers to drive them from the bench. This discussion is particularly 
effective because it denaturalizes the legal professionals' privilege 
and influences; it forces an examination of the social, political, and 
cultural conditions which supported the legal profession's growing 
prominence in the judiciary. Provine shows that this development is 
considerably more complex than conventional wisdom allows. 
There were at first few lawyers practicing in Colonial America, 
Provine reminds us. Economic conditions in the largely agrarian 
colonies were inhospitable to full-time legal practice. Moreover, the 
prevailing religious sentiment in some colonies was antagonistic to 
the legal profession. Several colonial legislatures specifically barred 
lawyers from their membership. In this type of society, the bulk of 
legal business was handled in a self-sufficient fashion by common 
citizens. Not surprisingly then, judges in early America were infre-
quently lawyers. They nonetheless exhibited considerable sophistica-
tion and legal awareness in the exercise of their duties. 
The expansion of the colonial economy and increased transat-
lantic trade created conditions amenable to a full-time practicing bar. 
lawyers increased in number and power. The institutionalized bar 
became more politically active and successful in advancing profes-
sional interests. With bar support, several colonies enacted legisla-
tion restricting the practice of law to lawyers. Other factors besides 
professional self-interest helped to consolidate professional power. 
The Crown, for instance, after years of neglect, supported efforts to 
organize and strengthen the bar in order to encourage stability and 
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regularity in colonial legal business. It was during this period, 
Provine tells us, that lawyers began to assert the necessity of exclud-
ing nonlawyers from judicial posts. Interestingly, the arguments first 
offered in support of restricting judgeships to legally trained profes-
. sionals did not emphasize the greater capabilities of lawyers. Most 
lawyers, after all, were still trained in a haphazard apprentice system 
while their competitors for judgeships who were not lawyers were 
often local gentlemen who had the benefit of higher fonnal education. 
Rather, lawyers argued for restricting judgeships to the brotherhood 
of the bar by claiming that lay judges were elitist and class biased. 
The early bar's attempts to translate newfound power into insti-
tutionalized control met with limited success. There were formidable 
political barriers to professional control of the judiciary which in-
cluded. the Crown's unwillingness to cede total control to lawyers. 
However in post-Revolutionary America lawyers achieved greater 
power as well as increased monopoly control over the judiciary. 
These changes occurred, Provine explains, because of a variety of 
factors and despite a general atmosphere of hostility towards law-
yers. Lawyers were able to exercise significant influence because of 
their prominence in the Continental Congress and in the Constitu-
tional Convention, and they became increasingly well represented in 
state legislatures. Additionally, Provine argues, changing popular 
notions of law and litigation justified the argument for a judiciary 
dominated by lawyers. Law became regarded as a means "not sim-
ply to resolve isolated disputes but as a means to shape broad legal 
rules to changing conditions" (p.20). Provine argues that such an 
image of law facilitated the argument for an all lawyer judiciary ca-
pable of dealing with an expansive and technically complex system of 
common law. Thus supported by both political efforts and changing 
cultural beliefs, the bar's attempts to professionalize the bench met 
with slow but gradual success. By the mid nineteenth century law-
yers had achieved a monopoly over higher judicial posts even though 
their attempts to extend this control to the lower courts met with little 
success. 
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Provine explores how legislative and judicial attempts to elimi-
nate lay judges continued into the twentieth century. During the 
Progressive era court modernization advocates emphasized the need 
to professionalize the .justice system. Reform advocates such as Ros-
coe Pound considered lay judges an anachronism. These critics 
claimed that lay judges were both incapable of understanding com-
plex modem litigation and more susceptible to bias and corruption 
than lawyers. And yet despite the apparent appeal of such claims for 
both lawyers and the educated public, the organized bar was unable 
to convince most state legislatures of the necessity for eliminating lay 
judges from lower court judicial posts. Provine argues that this was 
less the result of any disagreement with the reformers' low assess-
ment of lay justices than it was a capitulation to more pragmatic 
concerns such as institutional inertia, the political well-connectedness 
of lay. judges, and the tremendous financial costs associated with 
replacing lay judges with lawyers. 
A different source of criticism emerged in the 1960s when indi-
vidual litigants rather than organized interest groups began to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of nonlawyer judges. Since courts recog-
nized that criminal defendants have a right to legal counsel even for 
misdemeanor charges, it was argued that such a right was rendered 
meaningless when exercised before judges presumed to be unedu-
cated in the law and thus unable to comprehend lawyers' arguments. 
This line of reasoning suggests that in order to make due process and 
equal protection rights effective it is necessary to provide criminal 
defendants with judges who are lawyers. Provine examines the 
mixed success such arguments have achieved. In California the state 
supreme court concluded that "[t]he absence of a law degree disables 
a judge from understanding counsel" and thus that "[t]he failure to 
provide a judge qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal 
arguments ... must be considered a denial of due process" (p.68). 
This ruling paved the way for the legislative abolition of lay judges in 
the California lower courts. The United States Supreme Court found 
the claim that the use of lay judges in criminal cases is inherently 
unconstitutional less compelling. Importantly, however, Provine ar-
gues that this reflected the Court's recognition of practical concerns 
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such as the high cost of replacing lay judges with lawyers and defer-
ence to state authority more than any support for lay judges. Provine 
stresses that in both successful and unsuccessful attacks on the con-
stitutionality of lay judges the underlying characterization of lay jus-
tices as inferior was never seriously challenged despite the noticeable 
absence of any systematic empirical data on the matter. Unencum-
bered by facts, legal arguments rested instead on horror stories and 
anecdotes about lay judges' judicial performance. A recurring theme 
of Provine's book is that the debate over the qualifications of lay 
judges occurs at a symbolic or ideological rather than at an empirical 
level. 
These last points suggest that the bar's inability to achieve a 
monopoly over lower court judicial posts may represent a lost battle 
in a war otherwise won, since professional claims that lawyer judges 
were more autonomous, public-oriented, and technically proficient 
than lay judges prevailed even if attempts to abolish lay judges did 
not. Provine argues that it was not simply the presumably self-
interested bar that supported eliminating lay judges. Rather, she tells 
us, the critique of nonlawyer judges struck responsive chords among 
the larger public due to the influence of a set of beliefs and values 
described under the rubric of the "culture of professionalism" (Bledstein's 
phrase) in which competence and expertise are equated with credentials. 
From such a set of beliefs the characterization of lay judges as incompetent 
logically follows. Its very taken-for-grantedness illustrates how deeply 
professional beliefs and values have come to be accepted as givens in 
American society. A special strength of Provine's work is that it renders 
such beliefs problematic 
III. Comparing Judicial Behavior 
The core of Provine's study is an empirical assessment of the 
claims made by critics of nonlawyer judicial competence. Provine's 
central goal is to determine whether legal credentials make any dif-
ference in the quality of lower court judges as critics contend. In 
order to test this proposition Provine compared the attitudes and 
behavior of lay judges and judges who are lawyers in lower courts of 
limited jurisdiction. Although these judges process millions of cases 
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annually, this segment of the judicial system has not received much 
systematic scholarly attention. 
Provine studied over 1500 lower court judges in nonmetropoli-
tan areas of New York State. The bulk of her study data derives from 
a descriptive mail survey designed to elicit information regarding the 
judicial behavior and attitudes of her study population. Provine sup-
plemented her survey data with limited fieldwork by interviewing 
twenty-six judges and observing their courtroom routines. Addition-
ally, Provine brought to the study her four year experience as a town 
justice in rural New York. 
Provine's study evaluates two broad criticisms of lay judges: 
that they lack adequate legal knowledge and they do not apply the 
law in an unbiased fashion. In order to test the first claim, Provine 
examined whether lay judges are aware of, understand, and adhere 
to mandated due process guarantees designed to protect criminal 
defendants. She also tested select behavior such as whether lay 
judges impose bail more frequently than judges who are lawyers, 
rely on arresting officers for advice on bail determinations, or punish 
more severely those defendants who plead not guilty and are subse-
quently convicted after trial. Affirmative answers to any of these 
issues would tend to support the notion that lay judges are neither as 
knowledgeable about the law nor as meticulous in adhering to due 
process guarantees as their counterparts who are lawyers. Provine 
found some differences between lay and lawyer judicial behavior, 
although it was not always in the direction that critics of lay judges 
would predict. Her fieldwork also provided her with examples of 
judicial misconduct, but this behavior was not limited to lay judges. 
She also tested the second claim that the lay judges lack consistency 
when exercising discretion in such areas as sentencing. The thrust of 
this claim is that these judges fail to apply the law in an unbiased 
fashion, that their decisions are made ad hoc rather than being 
grounded in legal principles and precedent. Provine concludes that 
her data do not support the breezy criticisms of lay judges so preva-
lent in the literature. She argues that lawyer and nonlawyer judges 
exhibit few statistically significant differences in the key indicators of 
knowledge and fairness. Rather, Provine contends that poor facili-
258 Legal Studies Forum 
ties, the lack of administrative support staff, dismal salaries, as well 
as the legal professionals' attacks, account more for the negative im-
age of lay judges than a lack of judicial competence. 
How confident can we be in these findings? Provine is general-
ly careful to ground her arguments in the data. Nevertheless, there 
are limitations to her mail survey research. The major premise of 
such research is that the data accurately measure actual behavior. 
Yet there are always concerns of selective memory associated with 
reporting past behavior. This is especially important in Judging Cre-
dentials, since the lay judges Provine studied are well aware of their 
second-class status, are sensitive to slights to their office, and often 
pride themselves on their capacity to exhibit lawyerlike knowledge 
and demeanor. Such respondents may be unlikely to provide an-
swers'that would serve to characterize them unfavorably. For these 
reasons Judging Credentials would benefit from greater analysis of 
actual courtroom behavior to supplement the self-reporting of the 
survey respondents. Provine does provide information gleaned from 
interviews and observations of the judges she studied, yet this 
fieldwork is not sufficiently extensive to serve as more than sugges-
tive background material (nor was it intended to be). Ultimately, 
these seem rather minor concerns given the overall contributions of 
Provine's study. 
While her survey data do not demonstrate conclusively that lay 
judges are "virtually indistinguishable" from judges who are lawyers, 
as she claims (p. 103), they do allow Provine to make a strong pre-
liminary argument to that effect. Moreover, Provine's findings are 
generally supported by other related studies which she cites. In sum, 
Provine's data are more than sufficient to rebut the facile and sweep-
ing critique of lay judicial competence so prominent in professional 
rhetoric. 
IV. Summary And Conclusion 
Provine makes a valuable contribution to law and society scho-
larship with her study of lay judge - in the United States. Judging 
Credentials provides preliminary empirical data on a level of the judi-
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ciary that remains understudied - since research on lower courts still lags 
behind the study of the appellate judicial process - and for this reason 
alone the book is to be commended. Additionally, Judging Credentials is 
significant for what it reveals about professional power and control. 
. Provine's historically and empirically grounded analysis illuminates the 
politics of the legal profession's attempts to achieve monopoly control over 
the judiciary, and it convincingly challenges the profession's claims that lay 
judges are inherently inferior to judges with law degrees. Provine makes 
the case that the debate over the credentialling of judges often has more to 
do with professional self interest than with the public interest She contends 
that a consequence of the bar's increasing control over the judiciary is that 
lay participation in and knowledge of judicial process diminishes and that 
dependence on lawyers and alienation from law increases. 
Although Provine highlights the overt politics of judicial profession-
alization she is also sensitive to more covert forms of professional control 
operating at the ideological level. An ironic message in Judging Creden-
tials is that although lay judges may be as qualified for the lower courts as 
judges who are lawyers, it is likely that professional claims to the contrary 
will remain unchallenged. The notion that credentials equate with compe-
tence is not only a central tenet of professional ideology, but it is also to a 
considerable extent an unquestioned popular belief. Even though lawyers 
as a class are frequently held in low esteem, attempts to curb lay judges by 
replacing them with lawyers are generally considered progressive. Judging 
Credentials thus begins to explore how professional values, beliefs, and 
world views exert hegemony. Provine's work is more preliminary than it is 
fully developed, but it complements other scholarship investigating profes-
sional ideology, and it suggests fruitful directions for future research. Judg-
ing Credentials is an exciting book which should appeal to a wide audi-
ence. Provine's arguments are provocative, and. they merit serious consid-
eration from readers interested in the lower courts and the sociology of 
professions. 
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